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Abstract This paper explores and rehabilitates the value of decisional privacy as a
conceptual tool, complementary to informational privacy, for critiquing personalized
choice architectures employed by self-tracking technologies. Self-tracking technologies
are promoted and used as a means to self-improvement. Based on large aggregates of
personal data and the data of other users, self-tracking technologies offer personalized
feedback that nudges the user into behavioral change. The real-time personalization of
choice architectures requires continuous surveillance and is a very powerful technolo-
gy, recently coined as Bhypernudging.^ While users celebrate the increased personal-
ization of their coaching devices, Bhypernudging^ technologies raise concerns about
manipulation. This paper addresses that intuition by claiming that decisional privacy is
at stake. It thus counters the trend to solely focus on informational privacy when
evaluating information and communication technologies. It proposes that decisional
privacy and informational privacy are often part of a mutually reinforcing dynamic.
Hypernudging is used as a key example to illustrate that the two dimensions should not
be treated separately. Hypernudging self-tracking technologies compromise autonomy
because they violate informational and decisional privacy. In order to effectively judge
whether technologies that use hypernudges empower users, we need both privacy
dimensions as conceptual tools.
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BWhat if your Fitbit knew exactly what to say on a particular day to motivate you
to get off the couch and run a 5K?^
- Persado, Schwab 2017
1 Introduction
New technologies that use our data in order to steer our behavior are often accompanied
by worries about (mass)-manipulation. Uber’s (offline) collection of real-time data in
order to predict your next ride and tailor on-on-the-go recommendations (sushi or
noodles?) based one one’s location and past choices makes us uneasy (Schlosser 2016).
The Facebook experiment, in which tampered newsfeeds influenced the behavior of
users, sparked outrage (Rushe 2014) and visualizing a FitBit that uses personalized
nudges to coach the user into Bhealthy^ behavior is met with suspicion (Schwab 2017).
Moreover, the recent Bfake news^ controversy surrounding Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica reignited the debate about the manipulative aspects of data-driven personal-
ized communication and behavioral targeting in the online realm (Citron and Pasquale
2014; Hildebrandt 2008; Pariser 2011; Turow 2011; Zittrain 2014; Zuiderveen
Borgesius et al. 2016; Zuboff 2015). Yet, drawing in Big Data to nudge individuals
with personalized feedback to change their behavior, or Bhypernudging,^ is the latest
feature of many new technologies. The new frontier, and the subject of this article, is
self-tracking (Danaher 2016: 3–4; Galic et al., 2017: 30). Fuelled by real-time data,
algorithms create personalized online choice architectures that aim to nudge individual
users to effectively change their behavior. The question arises to what extent the data-
driven personalized recommendations of coaching technologies are in fact
empowering.
In this paper, I criticize the (potential) use of hypernudging in the field of self-
tracking. I focus on self-tracking technologies because most people wear them precisely
because of the personalized feedback they offer. If my critique succeeds, it follows that
information and communication technologies (ICTs) that hypernudge users without
their knowledge, such as Facebook, are ethically problematic too. I criticize self-
tracking technologies from an informational privacy and decisional privacy perspec-
tive. The aim is to explore and rehabilitate the importance of decisional privacy as a
conceptual tool to carry out this critique and to counter the trend to focus solely on
informational privacy when evaluating ICTs by emphasizing the relationship between
surveillance and decisional interference (Roessler 2005; Koops et al. 2017).
The claim of this paper is that hypernudges compromise autonomy because they
violate both informational and decisional privacy as complementary dimensions. I
support this claim in four steps. First, I argue that the type of personalized feedback
offered by self-tracking technologies should be interpreted as hypernudging. Building
on Karen Yeung (2017), who coined the term, I define hypernudging and distinguish it
from Bregular^ nudging. Subsequently, I show how its features of extensive surveil-
lance, hiddenness, and predictive capacity increase its potential for unjustified interfer-
ence by going beyond the safeguards of Bgood^ nudging. Secondly, I explore the
concept of decisional privacy as a complementary dimension to informational privacy
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and its value as a conceptual tool for evaluating hypernudging by drawing on research
by Beate Roessler (2005), Jean Cohen (2002), and Bert-Jaap Koops et al. (2017). Third,
I argue that in order to address our intuitions about the manipulation involved in
hypernudging and evaluate whether hypernudging compromises autonomy, we should
interpret this phenomenon from both an informational and decisional privacy perspec-
tive. Informational and decisional privacy are part of a mutually reinforcing dynamic—
rather than separate types. Fourth, I raise and counter three potential objections to my
argument. Finally, I conclude that self-tracking technologies that use hypernudging
compromise a user’s autonomy, because they violate both informational and decisional
privacy. Interestingly, it seems that while self-tracking technologies promise to em-
power users, they simultaneously compromise their autonomy in a different way.
Moreover, I conclude that there is value in decisional privacy as a conceptual tool for
assessing whether hypernudging compromises or strengthens autonomy.
1.1 1.1 Self-Tracking: the New Frontier for Hypernudging
Self-tracking, also referred to as life-logging, quantified self, personal analytics, and
personal informatics, is the practice of quantifying behavior through extensive self-
surveillance for the purpose of behavioral change. Users can record their behavior
through wearing digital devices (such as a clip-on, a wristband, headband, or ring) or
monitor their actions with applications on their smartphones. These technologies are often
connected to external online platforms where the data is pooled, analyzed, shared, and
compared (Lupton 2016: 22–23). Deborah Lupton interprets social media as self-tracking
technologies, and vice versa, because of the increasing interconnectedness between
different personal devices, applications, and social media. For instance, Strava is a self-
tracking technology but a social network for athletes at the same time. Especially tracking
one’s health and fitness data has become an increasingly popular practice. Fitness apps
and devices that enable the user to improve their athletic performances and overall fitness
such as FitBit, Runkeeper, and Strava are well known examples. Other examples include
DrinkLess (reduce your alcohol intake), SleepCycle (improve your sleeping patterns),
Lose it (aimed at weight loss), SexPositive (to track sexual activity), and What to Expect
(pregnancy). Medical apps meant for diagnosing symptoms (23andMe) and apps that
track specific medical data, such as glucose levels by diabetics (MySugr), are becoming
common and even recommended (Van Dijck and Poell 2016: 2).1
The main attraction and promise of self-tracking is self-improvement through
personalized feedback (Danaher 2016: 17). Personalized feedback is valuable because
it is an effective tool for behavioral change. Tailoring and personalization are powerful
strategies of persuasion associated with more effective online health behavior change
interventions, because users experience tailored feedback as more relevant to their
person and situation (Fogg 2003; Krebs et al., 2010; Smit et al. 2015).
If tailoring is persuasive, then what about Big Data-driven personalized choice
architectures? Choice architectures are designs in which options are presented to users
or consumers (Hausman and Welch 2010: 124). The design can shape the decision-
making processes of users significantly by presenting options in a particular way, by
1 The difference between fitness and medical data is vague. One can make assumptions about a user’s health
based on fitness data and vice versa.
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offering a certain number of options or by implementing a Bdefault^ option. Big Data
has enabled Bpersonalized^ choice architectures: choice architectures that are designed
according to user data feedback. Personalized feedback in self-tracking is based on the
analysis of large aggregates of (personal) information or BBig Data,^ also referred to as
personal analytics. The analysis aims to identify patterns and interesting correlations in
the data. Based on the analysis, many devices, and apps make suggestions to their users
about how they can change or improve their behavior, what choices to make. For
instance, your FitBit can tell you to increase your steps based on the individual user
performance it has measured and based on the performances of other users or Bpeers^
(Lupton 2016: 24–26).2 Another example would be an energy app that compares your
personal energy data to the data of the neighborhood population and encourages the
user to make Bgreen^ choices.3 Normative interventions are common in self-tracking.
Most apps offer feedback with regard to the performance of a user based on the average
for his or her age and sex, personal goals, or on a standard set by for instance the World
Health Association.
Most self-tracking technologies are still at an early stage of development. Nevertheless,
their potential with regard to behavioral change and steering choices is growing along with
the rapid progress that is made in real-time data processing, predictive analytics, and Big
Data-driven (automated or guided) decision-making processes. The potential of behavioral
change through self-tracking lies in highly personalized online choice architectures enabled
by smart algorithms that learn from and adapt to the behavior of the user (Michie et al. 2017).
MyBehavior, a self-tracking app recently designed by Cornell, is promoted as Bthe Netflix
for you health behavior^ and fine-tunes the algorithmic recommendations for personalized
feedback for behavior change that Bsticks^ (Metz 2015; Rabbi et al. 2015).4 One can
imagine that this has attracted the attention of policy makers who are interested in battling
national health issues like obesity, of employers who would like to keep their employees
healthy and productive and of companies that see the monetary value in aggregate collec-
tions of health data. Because of the current trend in insurance, policy, and employment, in
which self-tracking technologies are imposed on or donated to clients, citizens, and em-
ployees, it is worth evaluating Big Data-driven behavioral steering that self-tracking tech-
nologies may be capable of in the future. For the purpose of this paper, I criticize self-
tracking technologies that use Big Data-driven decision-making processes and are hosted by
corporations and governmental institutions.
1.2 Features of Nudging
Personalized feedback offered by self-tracking technologies could be interpreted as
harmless Bnudges,^ as ways to scaffold a user’s autonomy by offering Ba form of
choice architecture that changes the behaviour of people in a predictable way without
forbidding any other options or changing their economic incentives^ (Thaler and
2 Lupton (2016) lists other examples of self-tracking devices that use Bcoveillance^ and pool the data of a
particular group in order to monitor behavior. Work Time allows employers and employees to track and
encourage each other’s progress. Virgin Pulse tracks the fitness, diet, weight, sleep, and work commitment of
employees and compares the aggregated data for employers.
3 This app is used in one of Amsterdam’s living labs: http://oud.amsterdamsmartcity.com/projects/detail/id/85
/slug/city-zen-testliving-lab.
4 For the project website of Rabbi et al. 2015: http://idl.cornell.edu/projects/mybehavior/
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Sunstein 2008: 6). Ideally, nudges do not compromise your freedom. In fact, according
to Thaler and Sunstein’s theory of libertarian paternalism, you can change people’s
choice in such a way that they will choose what is best for them and what they would
have chosen themselves, had they not been limited by their human flaws such as
weakness of will. Importantly, nudges do not reduce or eliminate options, but simply
order your choice architecture in a way that favors specific options. The main criticism
of nudging is its potential for manipulation (Hausman and Welch 2010: 128; Wilkinson
2013: 347). Manipulation, as I understand it here, refers to the intentional but Bhidden^
steering of people’s choices by promoting and shaping decision-making processes that
persons generally would not use for making rational decisions (Wilkinson 2013: 347;
Goodin 1980: 17). For instance, shaping a choice architecture so that a person will only
perceive one option and will subsequently choose that option would be manipulative.
Nudges use psychological mechanisms in order to steer decision-making. For
instance, bright red arrows pointing towards a staircase will prompt people to take
the stairs instead of the elevator. The critique is that Bnudgees^ are not fully in charge
with respect to their behavior. Someone else steers their decisions based on psycho-
logical mechanisms instead of rational deliberation and argumentation (Nys and
Engelen 2016: 4). Moreover, because nudges are Bphysically^ unobtrusive (otherwise
they would not work) and its intentions are generally also not transparent, they are
potentially manipulative.
Then, in order to ensure Bgood nudges^ Thaler developed three critera. First, all
nudging should be transparent and never misleading. Users should be able to Bsee^ the
nudge and to hold the choice architects, the engineers of corporations, or
(governmental) institutions who structure the environment in such a way as to encour-
age a certain type of action, accountable. Secondly, it should be as easy as possible to
opt out of the nudge, preferably with as little as one mouse click. Thirdly, there should
be good reason to believe that the encouraged behavior will improve the welfare of the
nudgee (Thaler 2015). Now, let us assume for a moment that if we would adhere to
Thaler’s criteria, we could tolerate nudging. What happens when nudges become
powered by Big Data?
1.3 Features of BHypernudging^
The rise of Big Data practices adds more worries to the nudging debate. Yeung has
recently coined and defined Bhypernudging^ as the algorithmic real-time personaliza-
tion and reconfiguration of choice architectures based on large aggregates of (personal)
data. Yeung stresses that the hyper personalization of a user’s digital choice-
environment based on Big Data is incredibly potent and possibly manipulative.
By constantly (re)-configuring and thereby personalizing the user’s informational
choice context, typically through algorithmic analysis of data streams from multiple
sources claiming to offer predictive insights concerning the habits, preferences, and
interests of targeted individuals, these nudges channel users choices in directions
preferred by the choice architect through processes that are subtle, unobtrusive, yet
extraordinarily powerful (Yeung 2017: 119).
Hypernudges are also known as BBig Data driven decision-guidance processes^ or
Brecommender systems.^ Contrary to automated decision-making processes, decision-
guidance processes allow the user to make the final decision. A hypernudge Bmerely^
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steers or optimizes someone’s decision-making process via algorithms that offer a
personalized selection to the Btargeted^ individual based on the profile constructed
from (personal) information. This is also the reason why it is referred to as a type of
Bnudge.^
Hypernudges process past and real-time information from many sources within the
networked environment. Hypernudging is therefore based on live data streams as well
as a user’s personal data history. Moreover, it is not only the data of the individual user
that provides feedback, but also all the data of other users. Recommender systems use
collaborative filtering, which means that choice selections are optimized based on
Bpeople like you^ or people who choose and behave like you. These profiles are then
often informed by and mixed with individual informational input, in which the
individual user can insert information about certain options (by liking or accepting
certain options). The choice architect can then provide feedback not only based on the
individual’s behavior, but also based on and compared to an entire population.
Think about the personalized advertisements a Facebook user receives: these rec-
ommendations are constructed real-time based on your own behavior but also on the
behavior of people that share similar political views, lifestyles, or music interests.
Another well-known example is BGoogleMaps^ that updates and suggests one’s
itinerary real-time by collecting the (GPS) information of other users and traffic
information. Self-tracking technology Strava uses a similar technique by combining
GPS data and comparing athletic performances among users.
In sum, hypernudges use personalized recommendation to steer behavior. The
effectiveness of their interventions is powered by surveillance. The refinement of a
target’s choice environment requires continuous (corporate) large-scale data collection
about people’s decisions in order to specify data profiles of targets—which is stored
and can of course be used for other applications (Yeung 2017: 122).
1.4 Nudges Versus Hypernudges
Hypernudges are more sophisticated, intrusive, and powerful than Thaler and
Sunstein’s Bnudge.^ Thaler’s criteria for Bgood nudges^ are difficult to meet
because of three features that also distinguish hypernudging from regular
nudging.
The first feature of hypernudging is dynamism or the real time, personalized
feedback dynamic. This feature is enabled by the networked quality or Bsurveillance^
of hypernudging: the unobtrusive, real time collection, combination and analysis of Big
Data, drawn from multiple sources. This feature is powerful because of its one-to-many
capacity and personalization. Based on real time data, it can change the choice
architectures of millions of users in one mouse click. Moreover, it can offer each and
every one of those users a personalized set of options. A regular nudge is aimed at a
general public rather than directed at a specific, targeted individual and can only offer a
Bone size fits all^ option.
The second is its predictive capacity, which is constituted by smart algorithms that
Blearn^ from the collected data and make behavioral predictions that inform the
constant reconfiguration of an individuals’ choice architecture. While nudges may be
adjusted, this is a time-consuming enterprise. Hypernudges receive immediate feedback
about the effectiveness of their interventions.
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The final, overarching, and most important feature is the hiddenness and hidden
intentions of hypernudges. While nudges are also often not immediately detectable,
they are and should be Bvisible^ in the physical world (we can Bsee^ the red arrow
pointing to the staircase). Hypernudges are hidden in a more complicated and sophis-
ticated way. First, most users are not aware of hypernudges because they are unobtru-
sively integrated in most of our online informational environments. Furthermore, they
are also not aware that the choice architects behind hypernudges are corporations with
economic incentives. Google, Facebook, or FitBit may deliberately steer users in a
certain direction without their knowledge of the underlying intentions. Of course, this is
also a problem in regular nudging, if it does not apply to Thaler’s criteria, but in
hypernudging this hiddenness is inherent to the technology.
All three features problematize meeting Thaler’s criteria for Bgood nudges.^ The
hiddenness of hypernudges compromises both Thaler’s transparency and welfare
criteria. Because hypernudges are unobtrusive, they can be misleading, unjustified,
but powerful interferences with decision-making processes. Moreover, because of the
corporations behind many hypernudges—after all, data is the currency that makes most
online services and technologies commercially viable—we cannot be certain (or have a
way to find out) that the intentions and reasons behind hypernudging are legitimate and
are guaranteed to improve the welfare of the user (in the future).5 As I will emphasize in
the third section, the pre-selection of choices offered by the algorithm to the self-tracker
may be more aligned with the interest of the actor that controls the technology than with
the user.
Furthermore, all three features make it difficult to meet Thaler’s second criterion that
it should be easy to opt out of a hypernudge. For one, the level of persuasion increases
as choice architectures become more personalized due to real-time surveillance and
predictive capacity. Also, opting out is problematized by the hiddenness and unobtru-
siveness of these systems, and, many hypernudges cannot be opted out from without
quitting the service altogether. For instance, not showing women the same high-paid
job advertisements as men entails unjustified interference with someone’s choices and
opportunities (Gibbs 2015). Choice architects are responsible for whether people can
see their options and can opt out. If they are reckless or negligent, for instance by
employing hidden hypernudges, then this could be an unjustified interference with
someone’s decision-making process.
The emerging picture is that self-tracking technologies that use hypernudging,
interfere with users’ decision-making processes by using real-time, continuous surveil-
lance. While Bregular nudging^ is often the subject of worry, the features of its Big
Brother, hypernudging, make it incredibly difficult—if not impossible—to meet safe-
guards that should prevent nudges from becoming unjustified interferences with
decision-making processes. In the next part I will argue that these interferences can
5 Often, algorithms are corporate secrets, creating more barriers in understanding why one receive particular
feedback. Moreover, to complicate matters further, in some cases, hypernudges use inherently complex
machine learning algorithms (Burrell 2016: 3–5). The inner workings of algorithms are Bblack boxes^ and
cannot be (easily) explained (Pasquale 2015). Even expert choice architects often do not understand or can
explain how Bdeep learning^ algorithms work and have to rely on outsider feedback for mistakes made by
faulty machine learning (Byrnes 2016; O’Neil 2016: 154). The Bright to explanation^ has become an
important topic in recent debates about algorithms and machine learning. The renewed European General
Data Protection Regulation is claimed to protect this right, but its feasibility is contested (Wachter et al., 2017).
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be specified as violations of both decisional and informational privacy. Moreover,
because these dimensions are constitutive of our autonomy, hypernudging is worrisome
from an autonomy perspective. Interestingly, while self-tracking technologies promise
to scaffold one’s autonomy, they compromise one’s autonomy at the same time
(Lanzing 2016).
1.5 Two Complementary Dimensions: Informational and Decisional Privacy
Informational privacy has become the most widely used concept to evaluate the use of
data by ICTs. Informational privacy entails the ability to control who has access to
one’s personal information and to what extent (Westin 1967). Informational privacy is
therefore bound up with the concept of reasonable expectations: it is reasonable to
expect that the information shared with one’s physician will not be shared with a health
insurance agency for instance. These expectations about sharing and withholding
information are dynamic and context dependent (Nissenbaum 2010). They constitute
social norms that mediate and shape our social relationships. Scholars have found
informational privacy useful for explaining the harmful aspects of online data collection
by third parties that cannot reasonably be expected to have access to that information.
For instance, Yeung states that the right most clearly implicated by hypernudges is the
right to informational privacy, given the continuous monitoring of individuals and the
collection and algorithmic processing of personal digital data that it entails (Yeung
2017: 124).
Although the focus has been on the dimension of informational privacy, a more
general typology of privacy should involve many other dimensions (Koops et al. 2017:
2). Scholars have identified dimensions such as privacy of the body, privacy of
behavior, privacy of thoughts, local privacy, and decisional privacy. Informational
privacy is usually presented as a separate type of privacy that exists alongside these
other types of privacy (Roessler 2005; Allen 1988). Yet, recently it has been argued that
this may be a misrepresentation. Other dimensions, like decisional privacy, are histor-
ically and conceptually related to informational privacy and should be considered
complementary concepts (DeCew 2016; Koops et al. 2017).
Decisional privacy is broadly defined as the right against unwanted access such as
unwanted interference in our decisions and actions (Allen 1988: 97; Roessler 2005: 9).
Roughly, Bbeing interfered with^ means that (un)known actors or entities have access
to one’s behavior and decisions, which allows them to comment upon, interpret, or
change one’s behavior and steer one’s decisions, while this access does not fall under
the reasonable expectations of the user or subject or was not granted in the first place.
In the literature, there exist either very narrow or very broad accounts of decisional
privacy. On the one hand, decisional privacy is often narrowly associated with
Bnongovernmental decision-making,^ intimate choices including (same sex) marriage
and childrearing and the right to reproductive liberties. This stems from the USn
jurisprudence that grounded reproductive liberties in the right to decisional privacy
preceded by Roe v Wade [1973] (Allen 1988: 97).6 On the other hand, some descrip-
tions are broad, encompassing not only fundamental decisions about one’s life projects,
such as religion or relationships, but also actions, modes of behavior, and ways of life
6 Roe v Wade [410 U.S. 113 1973]
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or lifestyles (Roessler 2005: 14–15, 79). I will not commit to a particular view, but I
will assume, for the purpose of this paper, the broader description.
Privacy is a social negotiation. Whereas informational privacy would regulate access
between people to certain information, decisional privacy regulates the access of others
in the form of interpretation, objection, commenting, and other forms of intervention in
the way you live your life. Of course, the more significant certain behavior, actions, and
choices are, the more salient the need for calling them Bprivate^ in the sense that they
are, quite literally in the case of data mining, none of anyone’s business.
Decisional privacy provides the necessary breathing space to carry out one’s chosen
life unhindered in different social contexts, which is important for leading a self-
determined life and so, for autonomy (Roessler 2005: 80). In addition, according to
Ruth Gavison, it protects you from the interference of others, from the Bchilling effect^:
conforming your actions to perceived social norms out of fear for (social) sanctions.
Privacy thus prevents interference, pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment,
unfavorable decisions, and other forms of hostile reactions. To the extent that privacy
does this, it functions to promote liberty of action, removing the unpleasant conse-
quences of certain actions, and thus increasing the liberty to perform them (Gavison
1980: 448).
With regard to ICTs that use hypernudging, while informational privacy can capture
the wrong in collecting information, decisional privacy can explain the distinctive
wrong involved in using that information to subsequently interfere with a person’s
(or group’s) decision-making process. For instance, hypernudges compromise deci-
sional privacy, because users may not know or expect by whom their decisions will be
interfered with based on their collected information. Decisional privacy concerns
should therefore not be reduced to or merely understood in terms of informational
privacy concerns. Decisional privacy could be a promising complementary conceptual
tool for criticizing hypernudging.
1.6 Privacy and Autonomy
A right to decisional privacy aims to protect freedom from intrusions and interference
of the mind and the freedom to exercise autonomous (personal) decision-making.
Although decisional privacy does not feature as a concept in the European legal
tradition, article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights does acknowledge
the function of privacy as a right to personal development and autonomy as its
underlying value. Therefore, the right to choosing one’s own way of living, to self-
determination and the right to make one’s own choices about one’s body are mentioned
in article 8. Koops et al. argue that decisional privacy is Ba distinct type of privacy,
which protects the autonomy of persons to make decisions about their body or other
aspects of their private life^ (Koops et al. 2017: 40). This echoes Cohen’s conceptu-
alization of the right to privacy as protecting decisional autonomy (Cohen 2002: 44).
Decisional privacy thus resonates strongly with the liberal ideal of autonomous
decision-making. Moreover, we need decisional privacy in order to ensure decisional
autonomy (Cohen 2002). It protects, more or less, the freedom to select our own
behavior, actions, and ways of life without interference, as long as we do not harm
others—even though others may not agree with our choices because they consider them
to be Bfoolish, perverse, unhealthy, wrong or abnormal^ (Mill 2006 [1858]: 19).
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Decisional privacy is rooted in and closely related to autonomy. The two are
sometimes difficult to distinguish. Nevertheless, I focus on decisional privacy rather
than the more general concept of autonomy because it does distinctive work in
explaining the particular wrong at stake in hypernudging. As I argue below, its
explanatory power lies in the fact that it focuses on the contextual justification of
interferences with (and influencing of) decision-procedures. Importantly, it explains
why interference with certain decisions is off-limits for particular parties. Expectations
about decisional interference are context dependent. For instance, we do not reasonably
expect interference with decisions about one’s personal health or fitness by commercial
enterprises. Decisional privacy protects these expectations. I will return to this point
shortly.
All dimensions of privacy protect aspects of autonomy, for instance autonomous
decision-making, self-development, or self-presentation. Without privacy, these aspects
of autonomy cannot be developed or exercised. Like informational privacy, decisional
privacy has a functional relationship with the concept of autonomy. Privacy cannot be
reduced to another value such as autonomy, yet the reason why we value privacy is
rooted in autonomy (Roessler 2005: 67).
Furthermore, as I announced, there is a difference between autonomy and
decisional privacy. While the latter may be violated, this does not entail an imme-
diate loss of autonomy. Roessler argues that decisional privacy protects autonomous
authorship with regard to one’s own, unique biography: a life free from interpreta-
tion and comments, from people whom one does not want to grant this kind of
interpretative power (Roessler 2005: 84). Of course, this does not mean that we
make our decisions as isolated individuals. BPrivacy as decisional autonomy^ does
not deny that we are embedded, interdependent individuals (Cohen 2002: 47). Our
social relations constitute our autonomy. They influence our decision-making
processes, control parts of our lives, and determine or provide many of the values,
beliefs, and reasons we identify with.
What it means is that the level or kind of decisional interference we accept depends
on the social norms per social context. It may be wrong for your boss to comment on
the way you raise your children (non essential for the relationship), but not for your
partner (essential for the relationship). The kind of privacy that protects us against
interference by contexts that we did not reasonably expect (or grant) to interfere with
our decisions is decisional privacy. This is exactly what allows a wide variety and
plurality of self-chosen ways of life, behavior, actions, and choices, while the reasons
that underlie these decisions may very well be rooted in one’s community values or
discussions with one’s partner (Cohen 2002: 48).
To return to the point under discussion, remarks, or advice on one’s exercising
pattern, partner of choice, friends, religious expression, eating habits or career choices,
and (false) inferences or interpretations about one’s sexuality, music preferences, or
political decisions can be very serious interferences and intrusions even if one’s
autonomy is not immediately lost. For instance, when an algorithm offers a user
feedback on reducing her alcohol intake, including three self-help literature recommen-
dations, the suggestion to visit a physician—including three nearby choices—or several
recommendations for insurance policies, users can still plan their lives as they please.
However, it is a violation of decisional privacy. The decision-procedure of the user is
influenced and interfered with. This is not necessarily problematic of course. What
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makes this interference problematic is that this interference is done by a commercial
choice architect with economic incentives and that the object of decisional interference
is Bhealth,^ which is a domain we do not reasonably expect commercially driven
interferences with our decision-making process. Moreover, users are not aware of the
algorithm and its underlying incentives and intentions.
To summarize, decisional privacy is a precondition for autonomy that enables a
person to pursue certain lifestyles and life projects as she pleases without others
interfering. Decisional privacy seems to grasp something particular about the moment
that a person decides to choose or do something that he or she wants to choose or do
and who is reasonably expected to interfere with one’s decision-making process at that
moment in that particular social context. As Judith Wagner DeCew argues, many cases
concerned with autonomous decision-making about one’s body, intimate relationships,
and lifestyle are in fact privacy cases (DeCew 2016: 40).
Stanley Benn argues that in order to respect people as persons, we should regard
them as agents: as persons who are capable of making autonomous choices.7 To
interfere with their decision-making processes through surveillance is to violate
both their informational and decisional privacy. Without these privacies, users can
no longer be certain whether they are acting based on their own reasons, reasons
they selected themselves and identify with, or those of the manipulator (Benn
1971). In that vein, I want to conclude this section by stating that approaching the
problem of hypernudging from the perspective of informational and decisional
privacy is useful because it tells us something specific about the distinctive wrong
of decisional interference enabled by hypernudging. When hypernudges are hidden
and when the intentions behind it are commercially driven, they entail a kind of
decisional interference that is enabled by and powered by pervasive and pernicious
surveillance. This is a violation of both our decisional and information privacy and
a potential threat for our autonomy. In the next section, I will use hypernudging as a
key example of how these two dimensions are intertwined and therefore should
both be used as criteria for evaluating hypernudging.
1.7 Dynamic Dimensions
We have clarified informational and decisional privacy and have established that the
two dimensions are distinct, but related to and protective of autonomy. We can now
proceed with the suggestion that these dimensions should not be treated as separate
types but as part of a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Koops et al. (2017) argue that
informational dimension is strongly connected with other kinds of privacies such as
decisional privacy and vice versa. Aviolation of your decisional privacy often implies a
violation of your informational privacy (Koops et al. 2017: 56). For example, deci-
sional privacy is not limited to controlling and limiting interference with one’s deci-
sions, but also involves controlling and limiting information about those decisions
(Koops et al. 2017: 68). In other words, it is not only about determining who can
actually interfere with your choices (who has decisional access), but also about
determining who knows (who has informational access) about these decisions—and
to what extent.
7 This argument is similar to Onora O’Neills argument about treating people as agents. See: Kerstein 2009.
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Likewise, when informational privacy is violated, this may have consequences for
your decisional privacy. Informational privacy is not limited to controlling information,
but also involves controlling and limiting interference with one’s decisions based on
that information. In other words, it does not only mean that you can determine who or
what has access to your information and to what extent, but also about determining who
can interfere with your decisions based on that information (who has decisional access
based on information).
Similarly, DeCew argues that there are important connections between these dimen-
sions and that they are not very adequate by themselves. DeCew describes the link
between surveillance and our ability to make our own decisions so clearly that I hope
the reader allows me to quote in full:
(…) because the interests that justify the screen on information include the
interest in being free to decide and make choices about family, marriage and
lifestyle absent the threat of the same problematic consequences that accompany
an information leak. In other words, it is plausible to maintain that worries about
what information others have about me are often due to worries about social
control by government or others. What one can do to me, or what I can do free of
the threat of scrutiny, judgment and pressure to conform, may often depend on
what information (personal or not) an individual, state or others have about me.
Clearly my behaviour is also affected by the extent to which I can make my own
choices. Therefore, both the threat of an information leak and the threat of
decreased control over decision making can have a chilling effect on my behav-
iour (DeCew 2016: 42).
The rehabilitation of decisional privacy and emphasis on the relationship be-
tween informational and decisional privacy could be helpful in clarifying some
of our ethical intuitions regarding new technologies that use our data to steer
our decisions. When we say that hypernudging interferes with our decision-
making processes, we can specify this as a violation of decisional and infor-
mational privacy.
Hypernudges in self-tracking technologies could serve as an example to illustrate
Koops’ thesis that informational and decisional privacy are part of a mutually reinforc-
ing dynamic (see Fig. 1). Hypernudges can also be described as a feedback loop in
which data about decisions and actions is used for interference with decisions. The
resulting data about these decisions is then again fed into the system in order to further
tailor and personalize the choice architectures, thus increasing the persuasiveness of
interference.
If we want to explore in what way self-tracking devices that use hypernudging could
violate decisional and informational privacy simultaneously, we should focus on two
sorts of violations that are also deeply intertwined. First, we should look for aspects that
violate the user’s controlling and limiting abilities with regard to data collection about
their decisions. Secondly, we should look for aspects that violate user’s abilities to
control interference with one’s decisions based on data collection. I present several self-
tracking examples that illustrate how the two dimensions are compromised in self-
tracking as a hypernudging technology. I will conclude this section with a discussion of
three potential objections against my argument.
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1.8 Controlling Access to Information about Decisions
There are several aspects about hypernudges that violate the user’s ability to control and
limit data collection about their decisions. Hypernudges are networked and collect data
from many different sources. Hypernudges have a recursive nature. They process
information in order to shape the user’s decision-making process. Subsequently, infor-
mation about decisions is used to shape future decisions. Information about decision-
making behavior, including the decisions, is therefore of crucial importance to
hypernudging. However, users virtually have no ability to control this informational
access to their decisions. A good example is the recent scandal involving the WeVibe, a
vibrator that tracked the sex life of its users through a corresponding app. The app
collected usage information and connected it to user’s e-mail addresses and customer
accounts without their knowledge or consent (Domonoske 2017).
Decisions about our sex lives, our political preferences, and health are considered
Bprivate,^ in the sense that they are not anybody’s business in many social contexts.
However, Big Data-driven technologies are slowly blurring the boundaries between
contexts, granting access to parties that formerly did not have access to information
about your decisions. Commercial enterprises such as FitBit, Facebook, Amazon, and
Google now know when users decide to quit smoking, lose weight, vote Democrat, to
start a family, or to change careers. More importantly, based on user information, they
know what decisions users are likely to make in the future. This is problematic for
several reasons. The pervasive data collection and surveillance results in a loss of
control over the information about one’s decisions, because third parties are able to
access this information and use it for ends that the users could not foresee (Brey 2006:
161). The parties that control hypernudges are usually actors with commercial interests.
In order to create self-tracking technologies, they should be commercially viable. Users
pay for the services with their data and the choice architects use the data for their
commercial ends. Examples are health insurance agencies such as Vitality or Aetna that
adjust health premiums in return for using a self-tracking technology and achieving
certain health goals, but also employers who use self-tracking technologies to increase
productivity by monitoring the actions and choices of employees (Boyd 2017 and
Datoo 2014). Information that was formerly not accessible by, for instance, one’s
employer, like one’s geo-location, fitness, or calorie-intake, becomes accessible and
Interference with 
decisions based 
on data collection
Data collection 
about decisions 
and actions
HYPERNUDGING
Fig. 1. Hypernudging
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subject to evaluation, interpretation, and, ultimately, interference. Data that is currently
collected can be used to make predictions about groups and individuals and steer how
they will behave in the future. For instance, information about your lifestyle decisions
may become an excuse to interfere with lifestyle choices (BYour geo-location indicates
you were moving in Amsterdam last Monday at 02:00AM, while we had an important
meeting on Tuesday morning. Can you explain your behaviour?^). Data can be
retroactively used for purposes beyond our current imagination. Being aware of this
can cause a Bchilling^ effect on our behavior.
Finally, it is difficult to control or expect what decisional information is used in order
to receive unbiased and Baccurate^ hypernudges. Hypernudges feed past decisional
data into choice architectures. This can create a feedback loop that results in a Bself-
fulfilling prophecy^ (O’Neil 2016: 144–146). If you chose thrillers on Netflix in the
past, Netflix may recommend you thrillers in the future, which you will subsequently
choose, thus reinforcing the feedback loop. This hampers serendipitous encounters,
creating Pariser’s notorious filter bubble. But, there is a more serious filtering problem:
collaborative filtering. Hypernudges collect data from Bpeople like you^. You may
subsequently receive options that are Bpersonalized,^ but not only based on your
personal data but the data of an entire population. This can lead to unjust and
discriminatory choice architectures. In order to make decision-making processes more
efficient, ICTs use profiles: stereotypical (social) categorizations of data patterns that
can are powered by surveillance. Profiles Bproduce new forms of vulnerability^ (Ball
et al., 2009: 352). They hide or remove social contexts and relationships by reducing
bodies and behavior to data: data that can be easily controlled and manipulated and is
enshrined in a misleading aura of technological objectivity and neutrality (Monahan
2009: 291). For instance, because a user’s geo location indicates that one runs laps in an
area where the zip code corresponds with Bbad^ public health, one may be excluded a
health insurance or you may be targeted with alarming health warnings or pricy health
products (O’Neil 2016). Hypernudges may perform actions that do not correspond to
the needs or intentions of its user, because they made incorrect inferences and/or
because the results are unjust (Brey 2006).
In sum, who is in charge of the data, how the data is used (in the future), how the
data is interpreted and shared, how long it is saved, and what the social or individual
consequences are are all beyond the control of the user (Mittelstadt and Floridi
2016: 319).
1.9 Controlling Interference with Decisions Based on Information
Another cluster of issues revolves around the fact that hypernudges can interfere with a
user’s decision-making process based on Big Data collection. Several aspects of
hypernudging violate the user’s ability to control interference with one’s decisions
based on their information.
First, the main worry about hypernudges is that they meddle with our private lives
by interfering with our decision-making processes. Moreover, the worry is that ratio-
nales and reasons behind the choices they offer us will remain hidden to us and that we
will not even be aware of the fact that we are steered because we simply consume the
defaults offered by the Bseamless^ informational environments we increasingly live in.
Having choices, being able to identify with one’s choices, and being able to provide
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reasons for these choices are fundamental aspects of being a competent decision-maker.
Yet, hypernudges are hidden. Why one is offered a higher health insurance premium, a
certain recommended exercise program, or particular career prospects is unclear. Based
on the extensive surveillance and the—inherent—selling of personal data, we can be
interfered with significant choices in our lives in hidden and unobtrusive ways by
(un)known third parties—including companies and governments.
Second, contrary to nudging, hypernudging is robbed of its soothing blanket of
libertarianism. One of the ground rules of nudging is that all options remain
available to the user (Sunstein and Thaler 2003). The options are re-ordered, but
none are taken away. In recommender systems, such as hypernudging, options are
taken away based on the user profile. From every 100 posts, a user may only see 10,
selected by the smart algorithm. Users would never know what the other options
were. Also, a large portion of the selection that users see on Facebook or Google is
visible because someone paid to make it visible. Moreover, nudges should always
be in the best interest of the nudgee. The problem is that the pre-selection of choices
offered by the algorithm to the self-tracker may be more aligned with the interest of
the actor that controls the technology than with the user. The user may then be
steered in a certain commercial or political direction (Owens and Cribb 2017: 12–
14). As stated before, a user profile does not only represent the needs of the user,
but also those of third parties. The devil is in the default. A hypernudge can Btell us
what to choose^ because it will require several actions to negotiate and correct the
default options or to uncover the options that are not shown to us (Brey 2006). This
severely limits the user control for restricting interference with her decisions based
on her information and it could be argued that this even constitutes a case of
coercion (Raz 1986: 377–378).
Third, these systems are without visible, responsible agents. Users often do not
know who interferes with their lifestyle, career choices, or political affiliation based on
personal data or why. This is a violation of the user’s ability to control interference with
one’s decisions based on their information. Part of having decisional privacy means
being able to have reasonable expectations about who can and cannot interfere and to
be able to hold actors accountable for (the consequences of) transgression of these
boundaries.
Fourth, the hiddenness and unobtrusiveness of hypernudges is particularly risky in
light of its scope and structural cumulative effect. Hypernudges can influence many
people at the same time, with a tailored menu and create a constant barrage of intrusions
and therefore amount to structural interference in many different domains in a user’s
life, which is very difficult to control.
1.10 Three Objections
This section discusses three potential objections to my argument. One objection could
be that collecting and sharing one’s data are part of the trade-off that offers the benefit
of scaffolding one’s autonomy in return.
My response is that I do not argue that it is wrong or impossible to scaffold one’s
autonomy by using technology that collects one’s data. I do however argue that a
technology can never truly scaffold a user’s autonomy, when it violates informational
and decisional privacy. This is the case when the choice architect is a commercial or
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other third party that should not reasonably be expected to interfere with the object of
one’s decision-making process and when it is unclear how and why parts of our
decision-making process are interfered with (Van den Berg 2016: 186–188). In practice,
however, monetization of data is part of the business and development plan of most
viable self-tracking technologies. The widespread use of non-commercial self-tracking
technologies is unlikely.
As a second, and related, objection, one could say that using self-tracking technol-
ogies implies consent with their operation and how this affects the user.
My response is that the problem is that the meaningfulness of consent is challenged
in the age of Big Data. Meaningful, informed consent requires awareness and knowl-
edge of the practices of the technology, which is problematized when these practices are
hidden. When we consent to what happens to our data, we usually do so based on
experience and a combination of contextual legal and social norms. Before, those
expectations we consented to were relatively clear and easy to enforce when
transgressed. However, emerging networked technologies blur informational bound-
aries and corresponding norms and expectations. With the widespread and ubiquitous
collection of data, individuals often are unaware that their data is gathered and unable to
review all the data processes their data is involved in. Moreover, they are unable to
assess whether these are lawful, let alone to go to court if they are not (Van der Sloot
2017: 77). Also, users often rely on informational boundaries and norms that pre-date
the Big Data era when they use a new technology (Patterson 2013). Furthermore,
because the practice of these technologies changes rapidly, the risks change as well.
Corporations change their policies, take over formerly idealistic start-ups, and draw up
incomprehensible or deceptive terms and agreements (Turow et al. 2007: 747). Data
may be used for other (harmful) purposes in the future, which we cannot currently
foresee (Van der Sloot 2017: 76).
A third objection to my argument would concern what might appear to be the most
obvious resistance strategy, namely, simply not using self-tracking technologies. One
might wonder why this is not a viable strategy. Why would we simply not stop using
the technology altogether?
There are several reasons why I do not think that this is a viable strategy. First of all,
in order to avoid the harms of self-tracking, one should be able to afford not to use the
technology or have the resources to buy or use other technologies that do not violate
one’s privacy. This is unfortunately dependent on one’s privileges (Prainsack 2017:
121–122).
Furthermore, the use of self-tracking technologies is becoming increasingly institu-
tionalized or Bpushed.^ Employers, health insurances, and even NGO’s Boffer^ them to
their employees, clients, and target-groups (Lupton 2014: 7).8
But most importantly, resisting the harmful aspects of technology by advising users
to stop using the technology shifts the responsibility for a political and social problem,
with regard to how we (should) handle data and protect the value of privacy, to the
individual.
8 For Unicef’s self-tracking intiative see: https://unicefkidpower.org. For a health insurance example that
cooperates with FitBit or an Apple Watch see https://www.investopedia.com/news/fitbit-healthcare-deal-
unitedhealth/ or https://www.vitality.co.uk. For an example from the workplace see: https://www.theverge.
com/2018/2/1/16958918/amazon-patents-trackable-wristband-warehouse-employees
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2 Conclusion
In this paper, I aimed to both provide an evaluation of hypernudging and an exploration of
decisional privacy as a helpful conceptual tool for evaluation hypernudging in self-
tracking. In closing, I want to draw two corresponding conclusions. First, I evaluated
hypernudging and argued that under certain conditions, hypernudges may violate both
informational and decisional privacy. Hypernudging is a key example in which informa-
tional and decisional privacy are closely linked and inwhich theymight both be threatened.
Big data-driven decision-guiding processes collect and interpret data about our decisions
on an unprecedented scale, with unprecedented scope, across multiple contexts, and from
multiple sources. This real-time surveillance allows for real-time (re)configuration and
further personalization of choice architectures. This makes the technology highly appealing
but also a very powerful technology (Fogg 2003). Moreover, hypernudges are hidden. We
have to be careful to allow hidden technologies into the fabric of our online environment
and our decision-making processes. Hiddenness complicates the fact that corporations
produce most self-tracking technologies. Collected lifestyle and health data can be used for
steering users into making Bprofitable^ decisions, to act on certain offers, services, or
products. This makes users vulnerable to unwanted, profit-driven, interference, and intru-
sion in health and lifestyle-related decision-making processes.
Secondly, I argued that decisional privacy has value as a conceptual tool for
evaluating hypernudges in self-tracking. As we are increasingly adopting more self-
tracking technologies that use data in order to steer our behavior, it is helpful for
understanding and criticizing hypernudges if we conceptualize hypernudging not only
as an informational, but also as a decisional privacy issue. The two concepts are part of
a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Intuitions about the manipulative aspects of
hypernudging technologies can be specified as violations of informational and deci-
sional privacy. Moreover, now that I have argued that self-tracking technologies that
use hypernudging are ethically problematic, it follows that other technologies, like
Facebook, are problematic too.
In sum, self-tracking technologies that use hypernudges are potentially powerful
means of behavioral change. Although self-tracking technologies are intended to
support user autonomy, they might compromise autonomy on a different level. Self-
tracking technologies can interfere with influence and steer our decisions with regard to
our behavior based on extensive data collection about our decisions. Self-tracking
technologies promise to empower users but violate informational and decisional
privacy when commercial parties are involved in hidden, extensive surveillance, and
interference with decision-making processes that they should not reasonably be expect-
ed to be. Since informational and decisional privacy protect autonomy, autonomy is
under threat. Self-tracking technologies that violate informational and decisional pri-
vacy are therefore problematic from an autonomy perspective.
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